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Towards the Development of an Early ~arningdkesponse Network 
Howard Adelman and Susanne Schmeidl 
This is an abridgement of a proposal 
prepared by  Howard Adelman and 
Susanne Schmeidl of the Centre for 
Refugee Studies, with the contribution 
of Michael Lund of Creative Associates 
International. This article is based on 
the revised version dated 7 June 1996, 
incorporating changes in response to 
comments received on the initial draft 
proposal. A complete version, including 
the detailed budget and appendices, is 
availablefrom the CRS upon request. 
Abstract 
This articleoutlines a proposal putforth 
by the Prevention/Early Warning Unit 
at the Centre for Rejkgee Studies, York 
University. The article describes the 
problems with early warning and how 
an early warning network (EWNET) 
can address these existing dificul ties. 
This EWNET is described as an aca- 
demic-NGO-policy consortium that 
over a period of a few years will become 
self-suficient through the involvement 
of business. Util izing the Internet, 
EWNET will collect information from 
all over the world, analyze and dissemi- 
nate such information. The l ink to 
policy makers and the importance of 
properly communicating alerts are dis- 
cussed. While a central management 
team oversees EWNET, there are sev- 
eral units working on  administration, 
sales and research. Furthermore, the 
research unit is broken down into indi- 
cator, communication, response and 
area study research; the latter being 
linked to twenty crises area nodes. This 
structure assures that .E W N E T  will 
comprise a broad resource network as 
well as the links necessary for sending 
uniform early warning signals. 
Rtdigt sous l'tgide de U n i t e '  pour la 
dttectionet la prhention des conflits du 
Centre d'ktudes sur les Rtfugies de 
I'Universitt York, cetarticlefait ttat des 
principaux p r o b l h s  existant en ma- 
tiLre d'alerte prhentive et propose la 
crtation d'un consortium rtunissant 
des experts oeuvrant duns le domine de 
la recherche et au sein d'organisations 
non-gouvernementales a f n  de faire face 
h ces dif icultb.  Etabli sur Internet, le 
Rtseau EWNET, destine' h &re auto- 
nonae sur le plan fnancier d'ici quel- 
ques anntes gfrice ri l'apport de capitaux 
prids, doit rassembler, analyser et dis- 
stminer des informations en prove- 
nance de toutes les parties du monde en 
ma&re d'alerte rapide et de prhention 
des conflits. Structurt autour d'une 
kquipe principale de supervision, 
EWNET est consti tut  de plusieurs 
sous-unit& fonc tionnelles travaillan t 
sur les aspects de I'administration, du 
financement et de la recherche d'indica- 
teurs, la cornlnunication de l'informa- 
tion, la formulation de r4ponses aux 
prublhes rencon trt  et l'ttude de situa- 
tions rtgionales duns une vingtaine de 
rigions conflictuelles. Cette structure 
vise h assurer au rtseau une capacitt 
d'actionglobale tout en luigarantissant 
la cohtsion ntcessaire h l'envoi effectif 
de signaux d'alerte. Les problhes ren- 
contrts duns la rhlisation de cette tdche 
ainsi que la question des liens h ttablir et 
du travail de sensibilisation h effectuer 
auprbs des dtcideurs politiques sont 
aussi h o q u b .  
- - - - - - - - - - - 
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The G-7 meeting of leaders in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia in June of 1995 called for 
exploring the means to improve the 
analysis and utilization of disaster- 
and conflict-related early warning in- 
formation. It was noted that the issue 
was not one of collecting more infor- 
mdion, but rather the enhancement of 
analytical capacity and the availability 
that analysis to decision makers. This 
G-7 meeting merely echoed the many 
calls both within and outside the UN 
calling for the creation of a workable 
early warning system to assist decision 
makers. However, there is a difference 
between providing widespread sup- 
port for an early warning system rhe- 
torically and actually implementing 
one. 
Early warning is defined as the com- 
munication of information on a crisis 
area, analysis of that information, and 
the development of potential strategic 
responses to the crisis in a timely man- 
ner. Early warning differs from intelli- 
gence systems in at least two respects. 
Pirst, early warning is not concerned 
with a direct threat to the gatherer or 
analyser of the information or those 
contemplating a response. Rather, it is 
concerned with the protection of, or 
the provision of emergency aid to, a 
population within a territory in which 
there is either an inability or an unwill- 
ingness by the state to provide protec- 
tion over that territory because the 
state itself, or its agents, are the victim- 
izers, or because of the breakdown of 
the state itself. Inherently, early warn- 
ing is motivated by universal humani- 
tarian rather than national interests 
and is focused on issues concerned 
with interethnic violence, gross hu- 
man rights violations or genocide. Sec- 
ond, early warning information and 
analysis tends to be transparent rather 
than secretive in nature, unlike intelli- 
gpnce analysis. 
We propose the development of a 
comprehensive academic-NGO policy 
cionsortium to create a workable, effec- 
tive, economic and cost-recoverable 
early warning system to deal with hu- 
manitarian emergencies, complex 
emergencies and conflict areas. This 
proposal outlines initial steps to be 
taken towards the development of a 
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comprehensive early warning lmt- 
work or EWNET that will include pro- 
posed modes of communication as 
well as responses appropriate both to 
the analysis of a situation and the ca- 
pacities of various international play- 
ers. In addition to providing a link 
between researchers engaged in elarly 
warning (both quantitative and qudli- 
tative) and in-depth information m d  
analysis within governmental bnd 
nongovernmental agencies, a feed- 
back system will be created among 
these with other scholars engaged in 
indicator analysis, theoretical model- 
ling, case study research and commu- 
nication research studies on 
appropriate responses. 
Summary Description of the 
EWNET 
The EWNET will utilize the Interneit to 
develop one central coordinating unit 
for the EWNET and twenty regional 
crisis area nodes (CANS). Each CAN 
would have a coordinating team 
which would be located in a local inbti- 
tution, a counter research team wiUh 
great expertise in that crisis area 
located outside the CAN area, and a 
state with commitment to and concern 
for that specific crisis area. The mem- 
bers of the CANS would be located 
anywhere (locally and abroad). The 
EWNET itself would allow research- 
ers in crisis areas, field workers 
working with Nongovenunental Or- 
ganizations (NGOs) and Internatiorlal 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
(INGOs), and policy advisers dealing 
with @at crisis to share information. A 
wider list would allow others to access 
that information, while a limited 
number of researchers would be given 
the responsibility of analysing the in- 
formation. Each CAN early warning 
unit would be managed by a small 
team. The CAN would be linked to 
both the special research team on We 
area, and the central coordinating unit 
to enable all three units to interact and 
also enable the CAN to receive guid- 
ance on formats, key indicators, modes 
of communicating results, and a tool 
bag of potential responses. There 
would also be links of the CANS, tl+e 
special research units, the central coor- 
dinating unit with partners who as- 
sume responsibility for political and 
public alerts. 
The envisioned results would be 
based on the development of interac- 
tions on a more continuing and denser 
foundation. Accomplishing this 
would require, in part, the creation of a 
directory of researchers and analysts 
who work in each crisis area, as well as 
the creation of a directory of research- 
ers who work on the modes of translat- 
ing early warning signals into 
appropriate responses, and make it 
available to the policymakers, NGO 
and INGO personnel and other aca- 
demic researchers. The foundation 
would also include the development 
of a policy network as an integral part 
of the information/analytic network 
to enable policy parameters and issues 
to be fed into the area early warning 
net. In return, this would enable the 
crisis to provide norms for the classifi- 
cation of information and the ranking 
of early warning dangers, avoiding ei- 
ther U.S. or UN centredness while be- 
ing compatible with initiatives in both. 
EWNET would balance the need for 
transparency with the need to develop 
trust and reliability and include busi- 
ness linkages as a method of providing 
self-financing to an early warning 
system. 
From Early Warning to Response 
The raison d'ttre of early warning of 
human-made crises that result in ex- 
tensive human suffering is the desire 
to be better prepared to alleviate such 
crises when they occur, or, better yet, 
to prevent them from happening in the 
first place. Doing the latter requires a 
knowledge of the range of means that 
can address various sources of a crisis 
such as ethnic conflicts, gross human 
rights repression, civil wars, and geno- 
[Early Warning] is concerned with the protection of, or the 
provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in 
which there is either an inability or an unwillingness by the state 
to provide protection over that territory . . . 
feedback of analysis and the develop- 
ment of scenario outlines and possible 
strategic alternatives to be available to 
decisionrnakers who are active partici- 
pants of the net. This policy network 
would create a partnership of or~ani- 
zations that can translate these evdua- 
tions into alerts and link geheral 
theoretical and empirical studieswith 
comparative and area-specific case 
studies so that the information and 
analysis of all types form a feedback 
loop. Finally, this process would con- 
nect response and communicatioh re- 
search as integral elements of early 
warning analysis. 
EWNET would attempt to achieve 
these goals and outputs in accordance 
with anumber of criteria. These would 
include the introduction of principles 
of coherence and comprehensiveness 
into the analysis and the creatiop of 
response scenarios through the dqvel- 
opment of an indicator code for ev'alu- 
ating the type and extremity of the 
cide, and which means are likely to be 
most effective in given settings. It also 
requires connecting that knowledge to 
functioning organizational entities 
where analysts can assess the applica- 
bility of alternative response options 
to specific situations, and decision- 
makers can wield their authority to 
activate preventive measures. 
This issue of response has cast a 
number of doubts upon the utility and 
importance of EW. The two major ones 
claim that EW is useless and/or will I 
never function due to poor communi- 
cation channels between the "warn- 1 
ers" on the one hand and the 
"decisionmakers" on the other, and 
note the lack of political will on the part 
of decisionmakers. The first criticism is 
the fairly self-evident argument that 
even though effective mechanisms for 
connecting information, analyses, and 
appropriate responses are beneficial, 
the fundamental problem resides in 
the unwillingness among states to act 
I I 
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on the warnings proffered. Thus, al- 
though effective mechanisms for con- 
necting information, analyses, and 
appropriate responses are valuable, 
the fundamental and essential missing 
ingredient is said to be political will. 
The first criticism argues that even if 
early warning is important, the most 
critical issue is not information or even 
analysis, but the failure to communi- 
cate that information and analysis to 
key decision makers (Bush 1995), a 
problem that has plagued intelligence 
analysis in the past (Lebow and Stein 
1994). 
As mentioned above, we are in 
agreement that the issue of response- 
who responds and how-is the most 
critical, followed by the importance of 
communicating any analysis to deci- 
sion makers. Whereas considerable 
work has been done in identifying 
early warning signs of various incipi- 
ent crises, much less knowledge exists 
so far about what options are effective 
many of the problems associated with 
failure4 in communication and 
response1 
Proper early warning analysis im- 
proves response. We "explicitly 
emphasize that the design and man- 
agement of early warning systems 
should be intimately connected with 
the tasg of determining responses to 
warning. This emphasis complements 
the view that an improved capacity to 
know qbout and correctly interpret 
events early will improve the quality 
of responses that are brought eventu- 
ally to bear" (George and Hoff 1996). 
An effective early warning system de- 
vises appropriate responses. Without 
an adequate early warning system that 
provides good analysis, proposed re- 
sponses could be unrealistic due to the 
lack of any detailed understanding of 
the issue. As a result, such responses 
bring humanitarian interventions of 
any kind into disrepute and under- 
mine all international actions except 
- - - - - - 
The raison d'stre of early warning of human-made crises 
that result in extensive human suffering Is the desire to be better 
prepared to alleviate such crises when they occur, or, better yet, 
to prevent them fiom happening in theJirst place. 
in responding to them preventively 
under different conditions. Thus, the 
policy makers, being asked today to 
allocate scarce resources away from 
current crisis alleviation and routine 
programming to preventive capacity- 
building, need more confidence that 
there is a body of accumulated knowl- 
edge about proven preventive meth- 
ods that they can take off the shelf to at 
least guide them in dealing with spe- 
cific trouble spots. There is also little 
experience regarding the optimal irn- 
plementing mechanisms for applying 
those options. Consequently, EWNET 
will be designed to access what knowl- 
edge does exist on these questions and 
to sponsor new analysis to expand the 
current knowledgebase for preventive 
diplomacy. No early warning system 
can resolve the central issues of com- 
munication and action. Nevertheless, 
a working and effective early warning 
system can go a long way in alleviating 
those based on narrow nation-state 
interests. Further, any response must 
be monitored to allow for flexibility 
and alteration in the face of changing 
circumstances. The very foundations 
of an early warning system are those 
that can be used to monitor and cali- 
brate responses. 
An effective early warning system 
can help clarify obscure normative 
foundations for responses, such as the 
large obscure area said to exist 
between traditional UN peacekeeping 
under Chapter VI and enforcement 
action under Chapter VII (Urquart 
1995,3). We further agree with Sekerez 
(1996) that, "The UN needs to establish 
an early-warning system which would 
require intelligence and planning ca- 
pacities and which would alert the Se- 
curity Council for appropriate action 
and similarly, try to avert it from tak- 
ing wrong steps." Finally, early warn- 
ing is tritical to the effectiveness of the 
respopse itself for it can facilitate com- 
promise and the move towards peace 
between the parties to the conflict 
since, "it is only when actors are ill-in- 
formed about each other's capabilities 
or unable to anticipate each other's 
beliefs that secession or outside inter- 
vention may occur" (Cetiyan 1996). 
Proper early warning analysis also 
improves communication. We argue 
that quality analysis is essential for ef- 
fectiue communication though not in 
itself sufficient. Without a qualityearly 
wa-g system as the fundamental 
building block of an international sys- 
tem, not only will any communications 
lack content, beyond generally point- 
ing opt that a crisis exists, but it will be 
very difficult to derive appropriate 
and effective responses. 
More specifically, developing a pre- 
ventive capacity to respond appropri- 
ately to early warning signs in 
particular areas requires four kinds of 
analyses: 
generic knowledge of the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of a range 
of individual policy tools useful for 
prevention; 
policy-relevant lessons from retro- 
spective studies of actual recent in- 
stances when crises and conflicts 
have emerged, and preventive re- 
sponses have been launched (usu- 
dly involving several policy tools) 
that either succeeded in avoiding 
escalation or failed; 
clountry or region-specific analyses 
af a prospective nature that seek to 
anticipate or "test" the applicabil- 
ity of particular measures and 
multi-tool strategies to specific set- 
tings; 
organizational assessments of the 
uomparative capacities of different 
decision making and implementa- 
tlion mechanisms in undertaking 
tihe various tasks of early warning 
and preventive responses. 
ABqkressing the Problems of an 
Early Warning Network 
An effective early warning network 
must address a variety of issues: re- 
spohsibility; transparency versus se- 
creoy; the synergy of quantitative and 
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qualitative research; the relatiomhip 
with other existing early warning ef- 
forts; and corporate involvement. The 
proposed network must be able to re- 
spond to the challenges raised by each 
of these issues if it is to be successful. 
We will address each in turn. 
In early warning, in contrast to belf- 
interested intelligence, the benefit6 are 
spread very widely and constitute a 
net gain for the world rather tha$ for 
any particular party. However, as a 
result, there are two major difficulties 
concerning responsibility. Where 
should the responsibility for gathdrbg 
the information, undertaking the 
analysis, and developing approprhte 
institution to assume responsibility for 
gathering and assessing the informa- 
tion required by an early warning net- 
work. 
The second difficulty related to re- 
sponsibility, that of response, is inher- 
ent to early warning and the issues 
which it addresses. Precisely because 
the threat is not one to the existence, or 
even immediate wellbeing, of a mem- 
ber or set of members of the interna- 
tional community, most importantly 
the powerful members, the responses 
to emergencies are varied, complex, 
and difficult. Moreover, even if it was 
agreed that something needed doing, 
it is not equally obvious what should 
The basic idea of an early wurning system leans towards absolute 
transparency which contras@ with the need for traditional secrecy 
or, more accurately, conHentiality concerning some i n f o d o n  
or the sources of some information. 
responses be located? Who should as- 
sume responsibility for organizin$ and 
coordinating an appropriate re- 
sponse? Although, in theory, the 
answer to the first would seem obvi- 
ous-vesting the responsibility solely 
in the UN-in practice this solution is 
not functional for a number of rea$uns. 
These include the current financial dif- 
ficulties within the UN; the limitation 
of human resources within the UP4 (in- 
cluding the way employees are hited 
and slotted), and, as a consequence of 
the first two points, the unwillingness 
to assign the appropriate resourcies to 
build up such a capacity. With* the 
UN, there is the tendency to mierge 
operational with intelligence respon- 
sibilities, already hampered by the lack 
of an adequate analytic intelligence 
capacity. As subsidiarity emerge$ as a 
guiding principle within the UN, re- 
gional capacities are built up where 
both the knowledge and primary in- 
terests in responding already exisit. Fi- 
nally, there has been a marked 
unwillingness of members of the UN 
to authorize a full scale early warning 
intelligence activity lest it be used 
against some of the members  em- 
selves. Because of the combinati~n of 
these factors, the UN is not a vi+le 
be done and certainly not who should 
do it. 
The proposed Early W a m Q  Net- 
work is not designed to correct either 
of these two problems. However, we 
do provide a way around the first one 
by making the UN itself, and other in- 
ternational organizations, partners in 
a separate entity (EWNET) focusing on 
early warning. In addition, we struc- 
tured EWNET in a way to begin deal- 
ing with the second issue by praposing 
that a given state be appointed as the 
leader for focusing its early warning 
efforts on a particular crisis area and 
providing the leadership for re6pond- 
ing to a crisis where the state has exist- 
ing intellectual, NGO, and policy 
making resources as well as a strong 
humanitarian interest in resolvbg the 
crisis. 
Transparency 
The issue of transparency is a key prob- 
lem for early warning: how open, and 
widely, can and should information 
(and the source of such information) 
be shared? The basic idea of an early 
warning system leans towards abso- 
lute trans'parency which contrasts with 
the need for traditional secrecy or, 
more accurately, confidentialip con- 
cerning some information or the 
sources of some information. 
Guilmette (1996) is undoubtedly 
correct in his analogy to the flying but- 
tress in suggesting that "[tlhe 
emergence of large windows and 
transparency corresponds to moving 
away from the middle-age secrecy era" 
in favour of lighter but fragde walls, 
requiring a fundamental rethinking of 
basic architecture. This is a problem 
that occurs at a number of levels. 
Some argue that what is most im- 
portant about early warning is its total 
transparency, indeed its high visibil- 
ity, precisely to stimulate the political 
will that is not naturally in place as in 
the case of direct threats to state inter- 
ests. Thus, "[plrocedures should be 
established and organizations created 
for the public release of selected intel- 
ligence information" (Macartney 
1996). However, though early warning 
is far more oriented to transparency 
than secrecy, the basic architecture of 
an early warning system must provide 
some limitations on the input of mate- 
rials, more restricted access and corre- 
spondence for those doing the 
analysis, and some severe restrictions 
on very limited areas where confiden- 
tiality is critical. Flying buttresses, like 
electronic communications, may make 
a new institutional architecture possi- 
ble, and indeed even desirable, and 
may require much greater transpar- 
ency than ever before; but those new 
institutions do not overcome the need 
for private spaces and for restricted 
access to allow trust to develop (some 
of these issues are addressed in more 
depth later on under technological 
issues). 
A major hurdle to an early warning 
network concerns the relationship be- 
tween different methodologies in the 
collection of information for early 
warning purposes. In the past there 
has been a gap between academics in- 
volved in quantitative, indicator re- 
search to derive general categories for 
anticipating events, and those engaged 
in specific, qualitative case studies. In 
many cases there has even been mu- 
tual criticism of each other's work for 
the utility of early warning. More re- 
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cently, however, under the auspices of do not heed to cover a breadth of coun- 
International Alert, particularly under tries, their measures ran be much more 
the leadership of Hayward Alker, sensitive and case ~pecific.~ 
Kumar Rupesinghe, and Ted Robert Thws, it becomes very clear why the 
Gurr, specialists in indicator research linkagp between in-depth case study 
are applying their immense combined and ifidicator research can be ex- 
talents to undertake a series of re- treme4y powerful for the purpose of 
In the past there has been a gap between academics involved 
in quantitaSve, indicator research to derive general categories 
for anticipating events, and those engaged in spec i! ,  
qualitative case s t d e s .  
stricted comparative case studies 
along the model proposed by Alexan- 
der George of Stanford University. 
In the proposed Early Warning Net- 
work, we intend to integrate and insti- 
tutionalize these links between general 
theory, case studies, and indicator re- 
search, and further connect such 
analysis to those who have undertaken 
research on tool kits of appropriate re- 
sponses (e.g., Michael Lund) and those 
who have worked on the problem of 
communicating the results of analyses 
to decision makers in an effective man- 
ner. When providing links between 
indicator research and in-depth case 
studies, we combine the best of both 
worlds. 
Case studies, even when compara- 
tive, while able to provide a rich and 
in-depth view of one particular crisis 
and/or country, have the basic prob- 
lem of generalizability; it is hard to 
generalize from one (or several) case@) 
onto the larger "population." Thus, we 
may know what caused genocide and 
mass exodus in Rwanda, but we are 
unable to transfer such findings to an- 
other case. Yet it is hard to neglect the 
importance of the ability of case stud- 
ies to focus on the uniqueness of each 
crisis, which is very important when 
formulating responses. Something 
that might have worked in Rwanda 
may not work in Burundi. Thus, we 
need to seek out specialists on Burundi 
to aid us in pinpointing the unique 
solutions for Burundi before engaging 
in blanket reactions. In-depth case 
studies have the advantage of contex- 
tual sensitivity that large scale indica- 
tor analyses do not. Since case studies 
early warning. Each methodology can 
complement the drawbacks of the 
other and work jointly toward the find- 
ing of solutions to an existing crisis. 
Indicator research can furnish the nec- 
essary comparative breadth needed 
for understanding similar structural 
components of crises, while case stud- 
ies can "fill in the blanks" with infor- 
mation that is case specific. In brief, 
case studies lack the breadth, yet have 
the necessary depth to understand 
unique situations; quantitative analy- 
sis has breadth, yet lacks the necessary 
depth to provide a complete picture. 
Thus, there is room for a very func- 
tional division of labour and comple- 
mentwity. 
In light of the above, in a network 
linking diverse researchers together, 
researchers can exchange indicators 
and collaborate in their research in or- 
mother important issue is that a 
new early warning network cannot 
ignore the efforts already in existence. 
In recent years, several early warning 
innovations have been initiated by in- 
stitutions that are much freer than the 
UN or governments in making infor- 
mation and analysis visible. In addi- 
tion to the traditional watch (e.g., 
Africa Watch), human rights (e.g., Am- 
nesty International), and refugee or- 
ganizations (e.g., U.S. Committee for 
Refugees), there are specialized or- 
ganizations suchas International Alert 
in London, the Center for Preventive 
Action at the Council of Foreign Rela- 
tions in New York, and the Carnegie 
Notables Group in Washington which 
attampt to combine experts with nota- 
bles who can take care of the communi- 
cation aspects of alerts. The main 
problem with these approaches, how- 
ever, is the localized and fragmented 
nature of such innovations. The Early 
Warning Network proposed here at- 
tempts to overcome the piecemeal ap- 
ptdach by providing the potential for 
kniltting all these efforts together in an 
academic-NGO-policy consortium. 
Bven here, institutional innovations 
have been adopted to confront the 
limitations of state agencies while tak- 
ing advantage of their strengths as well 
a$ the greater freedom of NGOs. The 
rather open Burundi Policy Forum and 
the more restricted Burundi Security 
.. .[C]ase studies lack the breadth, yet have the necessary 
depth to understand unique situatfans; quantitative analysis 
has breadth, yet lacks the necaspary depth to provide 
a complete piCbure. 
, 
der do improve their models. Case 
study research can be used to supple- 
ment the knowledge from quantitative 
analysis enabling area experts to 
evaluate the information provided to 
them from quantitative models and 
case studies in order to tease out over- 
all patterns and the proneness of a cer- 
tain ~ountry to humanitarian disaster. 
Researchers working on responses can 
ultiqately rely on multiple analyses 
whe4 formulating policy suggestions 
and base scenarios. 
Forum were instituted to connect in- 
telligence from states, academics, and 
WGOs specializing in human rights 
rnbnitoring, refugee advocacy, conflict 
resolution, and emergency relief, to 
share information and devise appro- 
priate-responses, from the extreme of 
ddploying stand-by forces to more 
mqdest efforts geared to impeding 
arins flows, or freezing extremist lead- 
er$' foreign bank accounts and abilities 
to travel. Such efforts need to be ex- 
tehded and incorporated into an early 
- - -- - 
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Flq.  1 : EWNET PROPOSED OPERATING STRUCTURE 
Board of ~overnors (25) 
4 states (e.g. Canada, Denmark, etc.) 
6 international agencies (e.g. DHA, UNDP, etc.) 
5 other non-investor international organizations 
(e.g. OAU, Amnesty International, etc.) 
Executive Body (5) 
2 states, 2 international agencies, 1 other 
I 
Central Management Team 
Finance 
Chief ~xecutiie Officer (CEO) 
Assitant Executive Officer (AEOi)-Administration 
I'
Technical I 
Assitant Executive Officer (AE0)-Sales 
Assitant Executive Officer (AEO)+Research 
Indicator Communication Response Area Studies 
20 Crisis Area Nodes (CAN) 
(e.g. Great Lakes Region) 
warning network that goes beyond 
one particular crisis area. 
Furthermore, the United States gov- 
ernment already has a global eprly 
warning capacity which is i n c ~ a s -  
ingly moving towards transparency. 
For example, the U.S. National Sew- 
rity Council has provided satellitepic- 
tures of refugee flows to a$sist 
humanitarian agencies. U.S. Ambqssa- 
dor Albright released satellite phiotos 
of movements of prisoners and bqrial 
sites to help document Serb atrocbtjes 
in the Bosnian war. These, however, 
were not early warnings but very late 
warnings and after the fact analyses. 
The US National Intelligence Council 
has tried to fill the early warning qap 
by providing national intelligence esti- 
mates of impending global hurnanitar- 
ian emergencies associated with 
internal conflicts, dubbed 'complex 
emergencies,' for 1994 through 1996. 
Locating any early warning net- 
work solely within the United States 
has inherent limitations. There is a 
clear tendency to target for conflicts 
analysis that can be avoided, and to 
focus on responses that might ~esolve 
such conflicts without a major ex- 
penditure of human, financial, and 
political resources. To be more specific, 
the major developments of EW in the 
United States have been held hostage 
to Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 25 and the declared unwilling- 
ness of the United States to respond 
except where there is little risk and 
expenditure, financially or politically. 
Thus, the U.S. early warning system is 
not geared to assisting those countries 
committed to prudent international- 
ism or to challenge the current United 
States reluctance in this area. 
Last, but not least, another draw- 
back of existing early warning innora- 
tions is the absence of any business 
linkages. In a controversial article, a 
former Director of Intelligence in the 
United States, Stansfield Turner 
(1991), argued for the use of intelli- 
gence resources in direct support of 
private corporations. Russia has been 
the most advanced in using these sug- 
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gestions to redeploy its intelligence 
service for these purposes, unfortu- 
nately sometimes for allegedly corrupt 
practices. We propose, however, to 
take advantage of these suggestions 
for much more benevolent purposes 
by providing a system for making 
early warning a self-financing enter- 
prise while providing information and 
analysis needed by businesses to assist 
them in decision making. 
Operation of the Early Warning 
Network (EWNET) 
The consortium will be controlled by 
the founding partners, including 
states, international agencies, and non- 
profit organizations. It is critical that 
the design and management of an 
early warning system be intimately 
connected to the policy actors who 
carry the responsibility for determin- 
ing responses to any EW. We envision 
a corporate partnership of state and in- 
ternational agency investors. The con- 
sortium should be composed of 
approximately fourteen states, six in- 
ternational agencies, and five NGOs 
for the tegional crisis networks respon- 
sible for the basic information collec- 
tion and exchanges, analyses, and the 
development of strategic alternatives. 
The consortium will also be responsi- 
ble for setting up the protocols for the 
regional early warning systems, select- 
ing sites, and setting up the manage- 
ment team to develop the system as a 
self-funding organization through the 
sale of the analyses developed. Finally, 
the consortium will be responsible for 
negotiating a contract with a sales or- 
ganization that will sell subscriptions 
to the information network and analy- 
sis developed in order to make the 
operation self-financing (see Opera- 
tional Chart). 
The Central Management Team will 
consist of a small compact group with 
nine employees. In effect, the sales 
force and the actual research will be 
contracted out. The communication of 
the public alert would be left to policy 
makers and agencies. A Chief Execu- 
tive Officer (CEO) would oversee three 
Assistant Executive Officers (AEOs): 
Administration, Sales, and Research. 
Due to the nature of the [E W] network-a central point for 
correspondence fiom predominantly developing countries-it 
will be necessary to ensure that all correspondents have 
adequate access to the Internet. 
and regional organizations. While 
ttyenty of the partners would be re- 
quired to make a full investment, we 
expect to include five additional par- 
ticipants (such as the OAU and Am- 
nesty International) which will only be 
required to make nominal invest- 
ments. Further, it is hoped that money 
generated by EWNET can be used to 
fund research on the large data collec- 
tions and analyses of these organiza- 
tions. 
A central organization would be 
used for selecting research and analy- 
sis teams, defining their roles and re- 
sponsibilities, and developing 
normative and technical protocols for 
operations and research. The central 
body will also be responsible for man- 
aging funds and selecting the locales 
Coordination of the administration 
would be the responsibility of an AEO 
who would oversee both the financial 
and technical administration of the 
consortium. The technical protocols 
will provide increased access from 
those able to access information, able 
to input information, those participat- 
ing in the analysis, and those manag- 
ing the Crisis Area Node (CAN). 
Each AEO would oversee the par- 
ticular operations for that sector of the 
network. The AEO Sales would over- 
see the contract with the sales 
organization responsible for obtaining 
contracts with states, international 
organizations, corporations, etc., as 
well as ensuring that they have ad- 
equate access to the information and 
the analyses produced. The AEO Re- 
se&h would oversee the contracts 
with the various bodies (CANS) under- 
t W g  research in specific crisis areas 
as well as develop separate research 
teams in three other areas: theoretical 
modelling based on the comparisons 
of the various cases to further develop 
key indicators, communication re- 
search, and response research. 
The Communication research area 
team would focus on informing the 
early warning teams of intelligence 
gathering, reducing obstacles to ab- 
sorbing information and analysis, 
reinforcing possibilities for consulta- 
tions, initiating dialogues, and forging 
connections with institutions engaged 
in public alerts. The AEO Response 
resaarch team would have the difficult 
tas4 of undertaking research on bridg- 
ing the age-old gap between policy re- 
seatch analyses and timely policy 
initiatives. 
Elach Crisis Central team will con- 
sist of five to six operational members 
and a backup analytic capability of 
twenty to forty scholars and policy 
makers with area expertise. The infor- 
mation base will be provided by a 
larger pool of 200400 personnel with 
aocbs to information and specialized 
knowledge of critical aspects of the 
region. 
m e  efficiency of this system de- 
pends on the involvement of policy 
makers at all levels, the development 
of high profile alert units separate from 
the consortium, and the retention of 
control in the hands of a group of like- 
minded "internationalists" with a 
commitment to minimal standards of 
international behaviour. 
~ebnological Issues 
E W T  is a communications system 
an4 information repository that would 
comprise a web site and a listserv on 
thei Internet. The web site would have 
three purposes: 1) to provide informa- 
ti00 about the Early Warning Project to 
other researchers, subject matter ex- 
pevs, students and interested parties 
in general; 2) to provide a central re- 
p ~ i t 0 r y  for information posted by 
F!WNET correspondents from remote 
louations (through a password pro- 
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